Another member of Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance,” a constellation of pro-Iran proxies and partners, has been sanctioned by Washington. On Feb. 26, the U.S. Department of State designated Ahmad al-Hamidawi, the reported leader of the Iraqi Shiite militia called Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH). Despite the recent use of force by Washington, U.S. policy towards Iran and its proxies remains reliant on political and economic national security tools for punishment and coercion. The exposure and designation of Hamidawi is consistent with that trend.
Sanctions against Hamidawi were confirmed by Persian-language news sources in Iran. Much like English-language outlets, they provide scant biographical data. This lack of open-source material in English and Persian, however unreliable it may be, impedes a greater understanding of Hamidawi’s career trajectory as well as the overall leadership structure of KH, of which little is known.
This background matters greatly for analysts, policymakers, and academics studying Iran and its foreign legions. In a world without Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds-Force (IRGC-QF) Commander Qassem Soleimani, who played a key role in cobbling together militias in the service of the Islamic Republic’s regional aims, the non-Iranian men and organizations that constitute Iran’s threat network are slated to grow in importance. Already, there are reports about greater enmeshment of Lebanese Hezbollah in Iraq for purposes of training militias.
The most important – albeit complicating – piece of information the State Department revealed in its designation of Hamidawi was that he is the Secretary General of KH. Given that no start date for his tenure is given, that information conflicts with older open-source analysis from 2012 citing a man named Adnan Hamidawi, not Ahmad, as KH Commander. There is no known link between the two other than the shared last name. Similarly, in more recent reporting about the new leader of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs), Abdulaziz al-Mohammadawi (also known as Abu Fadak), a claim is also made that Fadak both served in and led KH as Secretary General at some point in his career.
Jamal Jafar al-Ibrahimi (also known as Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis), a designated terrorist born to an Iranian mother and Iraqi father who would come to serve as something of an “advisor” or deputy to Qassem Soleimani in Iraq, was essential to the founding of KH. Muhandis and Soleimani were both killed by a U.S. drone strike against their convoy in Baghdad airport in early January. KH was one of the first groups to issue a statement claiming that they would take revenge for the killing of Muhandis and Soleimani.
Throughout his life, Muhandis was involved in terrorist attacks against Western and regional interests reaching as far back as early as the 1980s. He had also supported multiple designated terror groups in the Middle East, all of which have ties to the IRGC-QF. And as referenced above, despite the designation of Hamidawi as “Secretary General” of KH, the organization was long-believed to have been led by Muhandis, who also served as Deputy Commander of the PMU in Iraq until his death.
Also known by the English translation of their name, the Hezbollah Brigades (more literally, the Brigades of the Party of God, and sometimes even Iraqi Hezbollah) KH is one of Iran’s chief regional proxies. Born out violence and chaos in Iraq in 2003 but more formally established in 2007, the group made a name for itself killing American and other coalition forces during the 2003-2011 Iraq War. After the war, KH became an important element in the paramilitary PMU (known by their Arabic name, al-Hashd al-Sha’abi), helping make the umbrella organization a vector to further Iran’s interests in Iraq.
But KH’s presence spans beyond Iraq. KH has been active in Syria in the fight to save the Assad regime, helping organize and train Iraqis for combat in that theater. Moreover, KH has occupied key portions of territory in Syria’s east, permitting it and other pro-Iran forces to control a key border crossing in what is popularly called Iran’s “land bridge.” Control of key border crossings and roads by militias loyal to Tehran enables the flow of men, money, and munitions from Iran through Iraq and into battlefields in the Levant.
KH was mentioned in the State Department press release sanctioning Hamidawi as having “claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq, including IED attacks, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations.” The release further noted that KH has not just targeted U.S. and coalition forces, but more recently “was reportedly involved in sniper attacks on peaceful protesters in Baghdad, which killed more than 100 people and injured another 6,000.”
The 2018 Country Report on Terrorism by the State Department cites Iran’s support to KH, as well as other terror and proxy groups. KH is the first pro-Iran Shiite militia in Iraq to be placed on the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, which is maintained by the State Department. To date, it remains the only such entity on the FTO list.
Moreover, KH has featured prominently in the U.S.-Iranian shadow war. Washington’s use of force in response to a Dec. 2019 rocket attack by KH that killed one American in northern Iraq was both important and historic for two reasons. First, the U.S. response entailed cross-border strikes in Iraq and Syria against KH targets, constituting the first time Washington used a kinetic policy tool in its otherwise economic and political maximum pressure campaign against Iran and its proxies. Second, it was the first – and to date – only time Washington has struck the same Iran-backed Shiite militia in Iraq and Syria at the same time.
Despite being designated, Hamidawi can be expected to continue wreaking havoc in Iraq on behalf of Iran. That means KH will likely step up its efforts to attack, bait, and bleed American forces in Iraq in a bid to evict them from the country. As with all non-kinetic measures, how Washington enforces its penalty is set to matter more than its announcement.
Behnam Ben Taleblu is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD).
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